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Contract Consideration and Behavior
David A. Hoffman* & Zev J. Eigen**
ABSTRACT
Contract recitals are ubiquitous. Yet, we have a thin understanding of
how individuals behave with respect to these doctrinally important relics. Most
jurists follow Lon Fuller in concluding that, when read, contract recitals accomplish their purpose: to caution against inconsiderate contractual obligation. Notwithstanding the foundational role that this assumption has played in
doctrinal and theoretical debates, it has not been tested. This Article offers
what we believe to be the first experimental evidence of the effects of formal
recitals of contract obligation—and, importantly too, disclaimers of contractual obligation—on individual behavior. In a series of online experiments, we
found that participants were less likely to back out of an agreement, forgoing
personal gain, when they were endowed with a small extra sum of money at
the time of contracting, and when they acknowledged that they were not forming a contract. They were more likely to back out of their original commitment
when their agreeing was accompanied by a recital of consideration, and in a
control condition in which the natural consideration of bargained-for exchange prevailed. Younger, male respondents were generally more likely to
back out of their agreements across all conditions than were women and older
participants. The reported experimental results suggest both the descriptive
weakness of theorized accounts of private control over contract enforceability
and the general value of experimental work about contracting behavior.
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“Under modern conditions perhaps the only devices which
would be really effective in achieving the formal desiderata
would be that of a nominal consideration actually handed
over . . . .”
—Lon Fuller1
“The parties may shout consideration to the housetops, yet,
unless consideration is actually present, there is not a legally
enforceable contract.”
—Judge John M. Woolsey2
INTRODUCTION
In 1941, Lon Fuller published his classic Consideration and
Form.3 Justifiably praised and cited as canonical,4 the article made a
Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 823 (1941).
In re Green, 45 F.2d 428, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1930).
3 Fuller, supra note 1.
4 Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 1417, 1479–80 (2004).
Fuller had a productive decade—only five years before co-authoring “the most influential single
article in the entire history of contract scholarship, at any rate in the common law world.” P.S.
1
2
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claim about consideration’s function that continues to influence contract doctrine today.5 Fuller argued that consideration does not just
aid judges in distinguishing enforceable from unenforceable promises:
it also has a behavioral effect on parties.6 It cautions individual signers
by “check[ing] against inconsiderate action,” and “inducing the circumspective frame of mind appropriate in one pledging his future.”7
Fuller claimed that the natural consideration of bargained-for exchange might trigger this contractual red light.8 But purely formal incantations like seals (“symbol[s] in the popular mind of legalism and
weightiness”), the “requirement of a writing,” “attestation, notarization,” and, crucially, recitals of consideration would similarly induce
individuals to feel and behave in a more committed way to the underlying term supported by the formal recitation.9 He posited that such
formalities produced behavioral effects by virtue of their connection,
in the popular mind, with law.10 The “neat[er the] division[s] between
the legal and the non-legal”—i.e., the brighter the line the law drew—
the easier it would be for the laity to see the signal and “deliberat[e]
where deliberation is needed.”11
ATIYAH, Fuller and the Theory of Contract, in ESSAYS ON CONTRACT 73, 73 (1986) (discussing L.
L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52,
53–56, 71–75 (1936)); see also PETER LINZER, A CONTRACTS ANTHOLOGY 166–67 (2d ed. 1989)
(“The Fuller and Perdue article is probably the best-known article in the contracts literature.”);
Fred R. Shapiro & Michelle Pearse, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles of All Time, 110 MICH.
L. REV. 1483, 1497–98 (2012) (placing Consideration and Form in the top fifteen articles published before 1960 that did not qualify for the all-time top 100 rankings).
5 Fuller’s observations were not novel, even if his formulation is now best known. See
Ashbel G. Gulliver & Catherine J. Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE L.J. 1,
4 (1941) (formalities in the gift context); Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to the Principle
of Private Autonomy: Lon Fuller’s “Consideration and Form”, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 94, 108–13,
116–24, 126–31, 140–54 (2000) (noting Fuller’s intellectual predecessors).
6 Fuller, supra note 1, at 800 (the evidentiary function).
7 Id.; cf. Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 5, at 4 (articulating a ritual function, “performance . . . for the purpose of impressing the transferor with the significance of his statements”).
Other authors have added additional functions. See, e.g., Joseph M. Perillo, The Statute of Frauds
in the Light of the Functions and Dysfunctions of Form, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 39, 56–57, 60–62
(1974) (enumerating functions apart from the classic three).
8 Fuller cites Austin to argue that natural consideration is its own check against inconsiderate action because “each party . . . contemplat[es] a quid pro quo[,] and therefore, being in that
circumspective frame of mind which a man who is only thinking of such advantage naturally
assumes.” Fuller, supra note 1, at 816 n.27 (quoting JOHN AUSTIN, Fragments—On Contracts, in
2 LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 939, 940 (Robert Campbell ed., London, J. Murray, 4th ed.
1873)).
9 Id. at 800, 820.
10 Id. at 803.
11 Id. For a similar argument in the property context, see Henry E. Smith, The Language
of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1147 (2003) (“[P]otential
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To say that these empirical assertions are contestable understates
the matter. Fuller suggested that Americans in the 1940s actually paid
attention to contract formalities, and that they associated legalistic incantations with legal power, even if contract doctrine at the time did
not.12 More subtly, Fuller concluded that individuals were spurred by
formalities to deliberate about their promises, and (impliedly) that
such deliberation would result in promisors taking their agreements
more seriously.13 Finally, he claimed that recitals of consideration
were behaviorally akin to seals and signatures, even though recitals,
which require no action by the promisor and are boilerplate legalese,
might be thought to be less powerful spurs to circumspection than impressing a wax seal with a signet ring.14
Given the weakness of Fuller’s empirical assumptions, it is astonishing that in the almost seventy-five years since the publication of
Consideration and Form, the idea that contract formalities induce
promissory behavior has become the unconsidered conventional wisdom.15 Most articles cite Fuller in concluding that formalities caution
readers and consequently change behavior.16 Entire literatures about
violators’ information costs bear on the design of the law. Property presents a simple message to
the outside world. . . . [T]he dutyholder only needs to know that he does not own the asset in
order to know that he must keep out. This keeps informational demands on the dutyholder to a
minimum.”).
12 Fuller did point out that some formalities—like the assertions of intent to be bound
promoted by the Uniform Written Obligations Act, 33 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6 (1927)—might be
ignored. Fuller, supra note 1, at 823 (“The net effect of a reform like the Uniform Written
Obligations Act, for example, will probably be to add a line or two to unread printed forms and
increased embarrassment to the task of judges seeking a way to let a man off from an oppressive
bargain without seeming to repudiate the prevailing philosophy of free contract.”).
13 Fuller argued that deliberation made it more just to enforce contracts, as an aspect of
the private autonomy theory of contract. Fuller, supra note 1, at 806.
14 Id. at 801–03.
15 Recent exceptions include Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 124–25 (1989) (noting that
Fuller’s behavioral account ignored varying information that citizens may have about content of
the law); Zev J. Eigen, When and Why Individuals Obey Contracts: Experimental Evidence of
Consent, Compliance, Promise, and Performance, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 67, 90–91 (2012) (finding
that legalized formation approaches were less likely to lead to obligation than moral framing);
Arnold S. Rosenberg, Motivational Law, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 111, 139 (2008) (asserting that
parties routinely ignore contract recitals of consideration); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & David A.
Hoffman, The Common Sense of Contract Formation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1269, 1297 (2015) (finding that individuals see formation as related to concrete events like signature and the exchange
of money).
16 See, e.g., David Gamage & Allon Kedem, Commodification and Contract Formation:
Placing the Consideration Doctrine on Stronger Foundations, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1299, 1309
(2006) (citing Fuller to claim that consideration “prevents promisors from hastily committing
themselves to obligations they might later regret”); James D. Gordon III, A Dialogue About the
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the power of private control over contract enforceability—like the
question of whether to enforce disclaimers of contract obligation—
rest directly on Fuller’s casual empiricism, or, less charitably, on his
unfounded anachronistic anecdotal speculation.17
This heavy reliance on a single article contrasts with an outpouring of recent scholarship on the moral psychology of contract, and
more broadly, a new school of contract empiricism.18 Experimenters
have found that promisors behave along a distribution of contractual
behaviors. At one end of the distribution, individuals act as though
following through with their promises is simply the right thing to do
regardless of legal consequences, and at the other, they act as though
form contracts made with organizations are morally inert.19 At the
same time, experimenters have uncovered a relationship between perceptions of legal enforceability and promissory behavior: promisors
are less likely to “breach” by finding a new partner when they believe
themselves to be in a legal “contract” than when they do not, even in
the absence of sanctions.20 So perhaps Fuller was right that certain
formalities caution promisors and thus affect the likelihood of deliberation and consequently breach. But which ones?
Promisors seem to associate “contract” with the formalities of signature and payment.21 But they also reject written legalese.22 Online
legalese presents an especially complex behavioral story. Likely because everyone has long acknowledged23—and now we all know24—
Doctrine of Consideration, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 987, 992 (1990) (citing Fuller for evidence of the
effect of consideration); cf. Zev J. Eigen, Empirical Studies of Contract, 8 ANN. REV. L. & SOC.
SCI. 291 (2012) (cataloging empirical studies of contracts; behavioral studies of consideration are
lacking).
17 Jane Baron made a similar observation in the trusts and estates context. See Jane B.
Baron, Gifts, Bargains, and Form, 64 IND. L.J. 155, 168 (1989) (arguing that functional explanations in gift scholarship rely on unexamined views of human behavior); see also Harold C. Havighurst, Consideration, Ethics, and Administration, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6 (1942) (criticizing
Fuller for “armchair theorizing”); Andrew Kull, Reconsidering Gratuitous Promises, 21 J. LEGAL
STUD. 39, 53–54 (1992) (arguing that there is a mere assumption that bargained-for promises are
considered more seriously than gifts).
18 See generally Eigen, Empirical Studies, supra note 16.
19 See infra notes 70–94 and accompanying text.
20 See David A. Hoffman & Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, The Psychology of Contract Precautions, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 395, 422–23 (2013).
21 Wilkinson-Ryan & Hoffman, Common Sense, supra note 15, at 1286–87.
22 See generally Eigen, Empirical Studies, supra note 16.
23 See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U.
PA. L. REV. 647, 665, 687, 704–18 (2011) (documenting and explaining the unlikeliness of “disclosees” reading mandated disclosures); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in
Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1179 (1983) (adhesion contracts are never read).
24 Yannin Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen, Does Anyone Read the
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that no one reads form contracts, there has been comparatively little
discussion of the likelihood that legal formalities will have different
offline and online behavioral effects.25 But knowing if formalities retain their power online is important. We react to proposed contracts
based on our interpretive models of what constitutes a legal “contract.”26 Differences in norms of contracting online and offline thus
matter in predicting and understanding consumer behavior—both
before and after an online exchange transpires.
For these reasons, this Article undertakes the first controlled
study of consideration recitals. We report the results of several online
experiments involving over 2000 participants. The basic framework
for the experiments involved paying participants to divide a sum of
money between two third parties. That is, we entered into a services
contract with each subject, supported by the classic consideration of
bargained for exchange. We then added an extra element—a formality—which depended on the experimental condition: (1) language reciting consideration (a “recital”); (2) language disclaiming contract
formation; (3) a recital accompanied by a sum of money; or (4) a control, with no reference to contract at all.
Participants were given the opportunity to back out of their commitments and claim a portion of the funds they allocated to third parFine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 30–31 (2014);
Zev J. Eigen, Experimental Evidence of the Relationship Between Reading the Fine Print and
Performance of Form-Contract Terms, 168 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 124, 132
(2012) (finding that of 1003 participants in a randomized, controlled experiment who had the
opportunity to review a form contract online, 28.9% did not review it at all, and the mean time
spent reviewing the contract among the remaining participants was only 80.5 seconds); Victoria
C. Plaut & Robert P. Bartlett, III, Blind Consent? A Social Psychological Investigation of NonReadership of Click-Through Agreements, 36 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 293, 295, 305 (2012) (discussing how consumers’ willingness to trust companies may be correlated with failure to read clickthrough agreements).
25 See Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 486 (2002) (“Systematic, published empirical studies of the
effect of the Internet on standard terms do not yet exist.”); cf. M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice
Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027, 1062 (2012) (discussing
research about website design and interaction with reading and processing contract terms);
Nancy S. Kim, Contract’s Adaptation and the Online Bargain, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 1327, 1351
(2011) (suggesting that online and offline contracts are seen differently by consumers). Of
course, proposals to deal with problems in internet contracting in general are legion. See, e.g.,
OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 12–13 (2014); Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The No-Reading
Problem in Consumer Contract Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 545, 551–52 (2014); Scott R. Peppet,
Freedom of Contract in an Augmented Reality: The Case of Consumer Contracts, 59 UCLA L.
REV. 676, 685–87 (2012).
26 See Wilkinson-Ryan & Hoffman, Common Sense, supra note 15, at 1290 (describing
contract schema).
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ties for themselves. Somewhat astonishingly—given the absence of
legal sanction for breach of the contract, the anonymous nature of the
survey, and reputed greed for small sums of cash among internet survey respondents—a majority of all subjects across conditions refused
to deviate from the allocations initially made, suggesting that even
anonymous internet respondents stand true to their commitments
most of the time. But some do not. We measured how likely individuals were to back out of their commitments, contingent on the legal
formality that attended the formation of their commitments. Finally,
we varied the identity of the third parties and the context of the bargain in different versions of the experiment to augment internal and
external validity.
As described in further detail below, as a main effect we found
that recitals of consideration produced essentially the same back-out
rates as no formality at all—it did no significant work in motivating
individuals to stick with their commitments. By contrast, bonus consideration—providing subjects a nominal amount of money (ranging
from $0.25 to $1.00) to seal their agreement—significantly increased
compliance. As Fuller long ago argued, the only “really effective”
form of consideration is “nominal consideration actually handed
over,” which motivates individuals to obligation by engaging the norm
of reciprocity.27 And, in a finding of particular relevance to current
debates about “no contract” clauses, disclaimers of obligation appeared to perversely increase the likelihood that subjects would keep
their bargains.
We also investigated how individual differences among subjects
influenced their compliance rates.28 Coincident with findings from the
literature on negotiation, but first explored as a contracts phenomenon here, we found a robust gender effect: women are significantly
more likely to keep their bargains than men. We also found effects on
two validated scales describing an individual’s orientation towards the
self and others, suggesting (consistent with literature on negotiation
and dispute resolution) that contract performance correlates with feelings of interpersonal connection and perceptions of self.
Finally, we describe what is either an age or cohort effect. Our
data do not permit us to disentangle these. Generally, older subjects
are more likely to remain committed to their initial allocations than
Fuller, supra note 1, at 823.
See generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Cognitive Errors, Individual Differences, and Paternalism, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 207 (2006) (encouraging focus on individual differences in behavioral
law and economics research).
27
28
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younger subjects. The differences here are stark: 54% of subjects aged
18–24 backed out of their commitments, as compared to 24% of those
aged 45–54, and only 22% of those aged 55–64. These findings begin
to suggest a research agenda on how birthdate can influence understanding of obligation and contract terms in e-commerce.
By exposing the literature’s gap, and filling it with initial evidence
of the role that consideration plays (and does not play) in online contracting parties’ behavior, this Article contributes to several dialogues
central to contract law and policy. Part I briefly describes those dialogues. Particularly, Part I illustrates contract doctrine’s uneasy stance
toward recitals (with and without money), even as the behavioral premise of Fuller’s typology remains largely unexamined. Part I also relates recent psychological research into lay promising behavior,
particularly about how individuals come to believe themselves bound
to contracts. Part II describes the methodology of the experiments described above in more detail and relay our results. Part III discusses
these results and their implication for how we ought to think about
consideration, and perhaps the reality of formalities more generally.
I. RECITALS

AND

BEHAVIOR

A. Recitals in Contract Doctrine and Scholarship
For judges, “consideration” distinguishes enforceable from unenforceable promises.29 Doubtless, some promises present easy cases for
enforceability—commercial exchanges where both parties have bargained for a return promise.30 Others are significantly harder—the familiar first year contracts litany of contingent familial bequests,31
charitable donations,32 promises motivated by gratitude for past conduct,33 and the like. For the difficulties posed by such marginal relationships, recitals of consideration might be thought to be an
anecdote: the parties can ex ante commit to waive the consideration
defense to enforcement. But courts only sometimes enforce such devices,34 and their pattern of enforcement defies easy categorization.35
29

Edwin W. Patterson, An Apology for Consideration, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 943–46

(1958).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
See, e.g., Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891).
32 See, e.g., Allegheny Coll. v. Nat’l Chautauqua Cty. Bank, 159 N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1927).
33 See, e.g., Mills v. Wyman, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207 (1825).
34 As Andrew Kull notes, there are probably fewer rash donative promises cases than the
scholarly focus would indicate. Kull, supra note 17, at 53–54.
35 See Gamage & Kedem, supra note 16, at 1315.
30
31
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Written recitals of consideration (“for good consideration hereby
exchanged”) are common in real world agreements.36 The First Restatement,37 the Uniform Written Obligations Act (“UWOA”)38
(adopted only in Pennsylvania),39 and at least seventeen additional
states have explicitly endorsed nominal consideration and recitals in
the last twenty-five years.40 But the Second Restatement, four states,
36 As an illustrative example, a search in EDGAR for that precise phrase (“good consideration”) returned more than 1000 hits in material contracts attached to Securities and Exchange
Commission filings. U.S. SEC. AND EXCHANGE COMM’N, EDGAR: COMPANY FILINGS, https://
www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2017).
37 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 84 cmt. b, illus. 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1932).
38 33 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6 (1927).
39 See DeAngelo Bros., Inc. v. Platte River Ins. Co., No. 3:09-CV-1198, 2010 WL 2635983,
at *5 (M.D. Pa. June 29, 2010) (Pennsylvania law generally recognizes the maxim that when
contract is executed under seal, party may not raise lack or want of consideration as a defense
except where there is fraud); Yocca v. Pittsburgh Steelers Sports, Inc., 854 A.2d 425, 433 (Pa.
2004) (under Pennsylvania’s UWOA, 33 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6, a written agreement is not void for
lack of consideration if it contains express statement that signer intended to be legally bound by
it). On the sad fate of the UWOA, see E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CHANGING YOUR MIND: THE
LAW OF REGRETTED DECISIONS 80–81 (1998).
40 See, e.g., Naseer v. Mirabella Found., No. 6:08-cv-1360-Orl-22KRS, 2008 WL 4853623, at
*1 n.1 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 10, 2008) (finding “even nominal consideration will support a deed” and
“recitation of consideration in a deed raises a presumption thereof and is conclusive for the
purpose of giving effect to the operative words of the deed”); Fugate v. Town of Payson, 791
P.2d 1092, 1092–93 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (finding recital of $1.00 clear and valid for creation of
an easement); Robison v. Lee, 2010 Ark. App. 839, 840 (2010) (stating court cannot challenge
the recital of consideration contained in the ratification unless fraud is alleged); Tyson v. McPhail Props., Inc., 478 S.E.2d 467, 470 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (quoting Jolles v. Wittenberg, 253
S.E.2d 203, 205 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979)) (“[A]ny nominal consideration recited in sealed instruments is sufficient as a matter of law.”); Clark v. CSX Transp., Inc., 737 N.E.2d 752, 759 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2000) (finding nominal consideration will support a deed and recital consideration not to
render a deed ambiguous); Lord v. Kiley Law Firm, LLC, No. 102,827, 2011 WL 2637424, at *7
(Kan. Ct. App. July 1, 2011) (noting agreement recites the consideration necessary to create a
valid contract based on mutuality of obligations); Murphy v. Saalwaechter, No. 2012-CA-000534MR, 2013 WL 3808019, at *7 (Ky. Ct. App. July 19, 2013) (finding recital of consideration and
payment of nominal to be enough for a deed); Mitchell v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No. 12 MISC
473427 RBF, 2014 WL 1159707, at *13 (Mass. Land Ct. Mar. 21, 2014) (quoting MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 183, § 6 (2014)) (“Every deed presented for record shall contain or have endorsed upon it the full name, residence and post office address of the grantee and a recital of the
amount of the full consideration thereof in dollars or the nature of the other consideration therefor, if not delivered for a specific monetary sum.”); BOB Acres, LLC v. Schumacher Farms,
LLC, 797 N.W.2d 723, 727 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011) (finding that recital of an exchange of nominal
earnest money that was not paid or requested does not preclude formation of an enforceable
contract); Gandy v. Estate of Ford, 17 So.3d 189, 195 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (stating recital of
consideration creates a rebuttable presumption that consideration actually existed but here rebutted due to lack of evidence showing the $10.00 was paid); First Nat’l Bank of Osceola v.
Gabel, No. A-01-968, 2003 WL 21146098, at *8 (Neb. Ct. App. May 20, 2003) (finding recital to
be contractual in nature and that “nominal consideration may be sufficient consideration as long
as the promisor deems it of value”); Jarns Holdings, Inc. v. Huang, No. L&T104949/06, 2007
N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 6132, at *5 (Civ. Ct. July 23, 2007) (“The ‘valuable consideration’ portion of
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and the District of Columbia still follow In re Green,41 whose wellknown quote headlines this Article, in generally declining to enforce
recitals.42 The reason is simple: “There is an underlying insistence on
the recital creates a presumption of consideration. However, this sort of recital by itself is insufficient to support a promise, so a specific amount is added to the recital, and such a nominal sum is
called a ‘peppercorn.’ . . . This type of recital of consideration signifies the fulfillment of adequate consideration by listing a specific amount to be paid, and goes on to include a general
phrasing of consideration, ‘and other valuable consideration,’ which belies a much larger sum
that ultimately proves the consideration to be adequate.”) (citations omitted); Williams v.
Ormsby, 966 N.E.2d 255, 259 (Ohio 2012) (differentiating between gratuitous promise and contract, court says long established precedent that it may not inquire into adequacy of consideration, but whether there is consideration at all is question for court); McCoy v. AFTI Props., Inc.,
No. 07AP-713, 2008 WL 2026437, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. May 13, 2008) (finding when valuable
consideration is recited in a deed, title passes by purchase and not gift); Pewther v. C CORP, 264
P.3d 173, 174 (Or. Ct. App. 2011) (treating transfer for $1.00 nominal consideration as valid
sale); Jitner v. Gersch Dev. Co., 789 P.2d 704, 705–06 (Or. Ct. App. 1990) (citing exception to
OR. REV. STAT. § 42.300 (2014), stating recital permitted but defendants may refute recital with
evidence payment was not received); Doe v. HCA Health Servs. of Tenn., Inc., 46 S.W.3d 191,
196 (Tenn. 2001) (finding “stipulation in consideration of $1 is just as effectual and valuable a
consideration as a larger sum stipulated for or paid”); Guesthouse Int’l, LLC v. Shoney’s North
Am. Corp., 330 S.W.3d 166, 186–88 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010) (finding extrinsic evidence inadmissible to contradict recital of consideration); Smith v. Riley, No. E2001-00828-COA-R3-CV, 2002
WL 122917, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 16, 2002) (finding consideration of $1.00 and other “good
and valuable consideration” recited in bill of sale and assignment were sufficient consideration);
Parker v. Dodge, 98 S.W.3d 297, 301 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003) (stating court will not inquire into
adequacy of consideration, but, in the interest of equity, may inquire into adequacy of a contract
“if there is such a gross disparity in the relative values exchanged as to show unconscionability,
bad faith, or fraud”); Bahr v. Kohr, 980 S.W.2d 723, 727 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998) (finding cannot use
extrinsic evidence to deny existence of consideration when express recital of consideration present in the deed); Wayt v. Urbigkit, 152 P.3d 1057, 1061 (Wyo. 2007) (quoting 23 AM. JUR. 2D
Deeds § 80 (2002)) (“The acknowledgement of the receipt of consideration in a deed is prima
facie evidence of that fact. A rebuttable presumption of the payment of valuable consideration is
raised by the recital.”); Brodie v. Gen. Chem. Corp., 934 P.2d 1263, 1268 (Wyo. 1997) (“The
question of what type of consideration is sufficient cannot be answered with specificity because
we have long held that absent fraud or unconscionability, we will not look into the adequacy of
consideration.”).
41 45 F.2d 428, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1930). See generally Joseph Siprut, Comment, The Peppercorn Reconsidered: Why a Promise to Sell Blackacre for Nominal Consideration Is Not Binding,
but Should Be, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1809, 1811–30 (2003) (discussing the reasons for refusing to
enforce recitals).
42 Five jurisdictions have recently disclaimed nominal consideration. Pullum v. Pullum, 58
So. 3d 752, 759 n.1 (Ala. 2010) (“[A]ny nominal consideration accompanied by ‘love and affection’ is sufficient to justify reformation of a deed.”) (quoting Snyder v. Peterson, 814 P.2d 1204,
1208 n.7 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991)); Liu v. C. Pierce Enters., No. CV0210898, 2004 WL 113568, at
*11 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 5, 2004) (finding fraudulent intent given nominal consideration of
$1.00); Koro Co. Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Co., 568 F. Supp. 280, 285 (D.D.C. 1983) (“It is generally
stated that the sum of one dollar constitutes inadequate consideration.”); Moore v. Missouri
Friends of the Wabash Trace Nature Trail, Inc., 991 S.W.2d 681, 686 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (must
give valuable rather than mere nominal consideration in order to acquire a fee simple interest);
First Union Nat’l Bank of N.C. v. Smith, 445 S.E.2d 457, 459 (S.C. Ct. App. 1994) (transfer set
aside if conveyance made without consideration or for mere nominal consideration).
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substance over form . . . .”43 The remainder of states have no recent
caselaw precisely on point.44
Courts further split on the effect of language adding a nominal
sum of money to the recital—i.e., “for good consideration, of $1.00,
hereby given.” Some courts hold that recitals of money (sometimes
called “nominal consideration”) can make enforceable an otherwise
unenforceable naked recital;45 others treat nominal consideration as,
at best, irrelevant, and, at worst, evidence of the invalidity of the bargain because of the now-evident disparity in value exchanged.46 This is
especially true when the nominal consideration is not exchanged—in
so-called “sham consideration” cases.47 The Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, which adopts this invalidity position for most ordinary contracts, rejects it in the options context, providing the twisty grist for
many a 1L issue-spotting exam.48
A related, and contested, form of recital seeks to privately manage enforceability by speaking directly to the parties’ joint intent to
contract. Classically, American courts deny that express statements to
be bound can substitute for consideration.49 At the same time, they
1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 2.17 (3d ed. 2004).
See, e.g., Estate of Bishop v. Donovan, 25 Cal. Rptr. 763, 767 (Ct. App. 1962) (“[A]
valuable consideration is not limited to the payment of money or other material exchange; may
be based on a promise; consist of the cancellation of a debt; or arise out of a waiver of rights; and
a transfer for such a consideration is not a gift. The extent thereof is not important even though
the recital of a mere nominal consideration in an instrument of transfer does not foreclose a
finding that the transaction was a gift.”) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); Rose v. Lurvey,
198 N.W.2d 839, 841–42 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972) (under court’s equitable powers, invalidating
transfer of real estate for $1.05, although stating “[i]t is a general principle of contract law that
courts will not ordinarily look into the adequacy of the consideration in an agreed exchange. . . .
[unless] the inadequacy of consideration is particularly glaring”); Sfreddo v. Sfreddo, 720 S.E.2d
145, 156 (Va. Ct. App. 2012) (“[W]here nominal consideration and the surrounding circumstances of a contract demonstrate a gift rather than a bargained for sale occurred, the court
should find the transaction constitutes a gift. The party seeking to show a gift has the burden of
proof by clear and convincing evidence.”).
45 JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 4.6 (6th ed. 2009).
46 Rose, 198 N.W.2d at 841–42; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 cmt. d (AM.
LAW INST. 1981).
47 Siprut also distinguishes as we do between nominal consideration and sham consideration. See Siprut, supra note 41, at 1821 n.80.
48 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87. Technically, the “recital gives rise to
an implied promise to pay.” PERILLO, supra note 45; see JOHN P. DAWSON, GIFTS AND PROMISES:
CONTINENTAL AND AMERICAN LAW COMPARED 212 (1980).
49 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 21 (“Neither real nor apparent intention
that a promise be legally binding is essential to the formation of a contract, but a manifestation
of intention that a promise shall not affect legal relations may prevent the formation of a contract.”). There are exceptions. For instance, under the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”)
(particularly § 2-305), courts ask if the parties intended to conclude a contract—that is, did they
43
44
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will usually enforce recitals that disclaim the intent to be bound, so
long as the other party knows of that disclaimed intent.50 Thus, employers often seek to use employee manuals to set limits on employment benefits and parameterize disciplinary procedures without
turning at-will employment into a contract simply by conspicuously
disclaiming their intent to be bound.51
This muddled doctrine on recitals continues to generate scholarly
ferment.52 Some scholars—particularly legal economists—think that
refusing to permit private control over enforceability is foolish.53 Williston argued that the purposes of consideration doctrine were as well
served by a formal recital as by a substantive bargained-for exchange.54 It thus makes little sense to deny enforcement of a promise
where the parties have been forewarned of the likelihood of court intervention in a way that is easily proven after the fact.55 But for other
scholars, consideration identifies (on the merits) the kinds of bargains
that society thinks worth enforcing.56 As such, private party control
over enforcement seems troublingly akin to private party control over
intend to be legally bound? U.C.C. § 2-305 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2012). If so,
courts will fill in the open terms with UCC gap fillers. Id. Similarly, the Pennsylvania UWOA
requires particular language referencing intention. And, finally, language proclaiming intent may
be relevant to issues of interpretation.
50 See Eiland v. Wolf, 764 S.W.2d 827, 839 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (refusing to hold university
system liable for course catalogue requirements in light of disclaiming language); 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 43, § 3.7; PERILLO, supra note 45, § 2.4 (collecting cases).
51 See, e.g., Evenson v. Colo. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 879 P.2d 402, 408 (Colo. App.
1993); Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason Co., 540 N.W.2d 277, 287–89 (Iowa 1995) (holding that
an “explicit disclaimer[ ]” in an employee manual barred formation). See generally Stephen F.
Befort, Employee Handbooks and the Legal Effect of Disclaimers, 13 INDUS. REL. L.J. 326,
340–43 (1991/1992); Larry A. Dimatteo, Robert C. Bird & Jason A. Colquitt, Justice, Employment, and the Psychological Contract, 90 OR. L. REV. 449, 457 (2011); Natalie Bucciarelli Pedersen, A Subjective Approach to Contracts?: How Courts Interpret Employee Handbook
Disclaimers, 26 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 101 (2008).
52 See, e.g., Val Ricks, Consideration and the Formation Defenses, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 315,
315–17 (2013).
53 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 99 (6th ed. 2003) (“The real
mystery in the ‘moral consideration’ cases is why the law doesn’t simply make available a form
for making binding promises without requiring consideration . . . . Promises made under seal
were enforceable without consideration. This was, seemingly, a useful device; its disappearance
is a puzzle.”); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Principles of Consideration, 67 CORNELL L. REV.
640, 659–60 (1982); Siprut, supra note 41, at 1809–10.
54 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE
LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE 35TH ANNUAL MEETING 194 (1925) (“It is something . . . that a
person ought to be able to do, if he wishes to do it,—to create a legal obligation to make a gift.
Why not? . . . I don’t see why a man should not be able to make himself liable if he wishes to do
so.”).
55 Siprut, supra note 41, at 1809–10.
56 See, e.g., Fuller, supra note 1, at 814–15.
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other areas of public law.57 Sham consideration, the paradigmatic
empty formality, strays too far from consideration’s substantive roots
and should be rejected by all right-thinking judges.58
As this brief summary should illustrate, jurists’ views on private
party control over enforceability vary widely. And yet these divergent
views rest on a common behavioral foundation: Fuller’s claim that recitals actually caution promisors. His account of the cautionary function’s mechanism is endlessly cited.59 Similarly cited by rote is his
claim that recitals will act just like natural consideration in cautioning
action.60 While some scholars question whether promisors will react to
recitals given their sheer incomprehensibility,61 the conventional wisdom simply lumps all formalities together and assumes they cause individuals to think they are in bargains (and thus to behave in trusting
ways).62
By contrast, scholars have not universally agreed that “intent to
be bound” clauses have behavioral weight.63 When Randy Barnett argued that courts should give effect to recitals of the intent,64 many
scholars responded that such “intent to be legally bound” clauses are
57 See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 666 (2005)
(articulating concerns about private control over procedure).
58

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF

CONTRACTS § 218 cmt. e, illus. 3 (AM. LAW INST.

1981).
See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 5, at 102 (consideration formalities ensure parties
“thought carefully before making the kind of promise in question”).

R

60 Gamage & Kedem, supra note 16, at 1309; Eric Mills Holmes, Stature and Status of a
Promise Under Seal as a Legal Formality, 29 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 617, 627–28 (1993); Kim,
supra note 25, at 1348; Charles L. Knapp, Opting Out or Copping Out? An Argument for Strict
Scrutiny of Individual Contracts, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 95, 113–14 (2006) (arguing that signatures
online provide less cautionary effect); Juliet M. Moringiello, Signals, Assent and Internet Contracting, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 1307, 1313 (2005) (regarding the cautionary function of signatures); Rosenberg, supra note 15, at 114. But cf. Michael J. Hays, Note, The E-Sign Act of 2000:
The Triumph of Function over Form in American Contract Law, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1183,
1194 (2001) (criticizing E-Sign Act for not emphasizing cautionary aspects of digital signature).

R

59

61

Gordon, supra note 16, at 997.

Professor Wessman argues that “token payment probably has no greater cautionary effect than a simple requirement of form (for example, a signed writing or the use of specified
language).” Mark B. Wessman, Retraining the Gatekeeper: Further Reflections on the Doctrine of
Consideration, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 713, 729 (1996).
62

63 Much of this literature responds to Randy Barnett’s famous defense of an intent-to-belegally-bound justification for contract enforcement. See Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of
Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986).
64 Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 627, 635 (2002)
(“Clicking the button that says ‘I agree,’ no less than signing one’s name on the dotted line,
indicates unambiguously: I agree to be legally bound by the terms in this agreement.”).
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likely to at best be behaviorally inert.65 Indeed, as Greg Klass hypothesized, perhaps such clauses will drive individuals away from
relationships:
The existence and magnitude of these relational costs depend on the context. Many agreements clearly contemplate
legal liability, whether the parties say so or not. . . . In such
transactions, also saying, “This is a legally enforceable agreement,” would have no relational costs. In other agreements,
the costs will be higher. . . . In such circumstances, a revealed
preference for legal liability could do significant harm.66
Finally, to the extent that the legal literature has considered the
effect of clauses that seek to disclaim contractual relationships, they
are usually thought to be likely to accomplish the behavioral purposes
that they seek—namely, encouraging parties to believe they are not in
a legal contract.67 Randy Barnett’s well-known proposed reformulation of contract law as consent-based would privilege disclaimers as
self-evidently satisfying the cautionary function.68 That said, some
scholars, like Sidney DeLong, suggest that in particular contexts—like
employment relationships—disclaimers of legal intent will be misunderstood or entirely ignored when they conflict with ordinary moral
intuitions.69
B. Prior Empirical Evidence on Recitals and Behavior
Though ours provides the first controlled exploration of the behavioral effect of contract recitals, there have been a number of recent
papers studying the effects of other contract terms.70 Several findings
from these studies are especially relevant.71
65 See, e.g., Todd D. Rakoff, Is “Freedom from Contract” Necessarily a Libertarian Freedom?, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 477, 492 (citing Patterson, supra note 29, at 949).
66 Gregory Klass, Intent to Contract, 95 VA. L. REV. 1437, 1474–75 (2009).
67 See, e.g., DiMatteo et al., supra note 51, at 471–72 (evidence that disclaimers will reduce
sense of legal obligation).
68 See Randy E. Barnett, The Death of Reliance, 46 J. LEGAL. EDUC. 518, 532 (1996).
69 E.g., Sidney W. DeLong, Placid, Clear-Seeming Words: Some Realism About the New
Formalism (with Particular Reference to Promissory Estoppel), 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 13, 31–32
(2001); see also Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 133–46 (1997).
70 These papers are a part of a larger tradition studying how morality and contract intersect. See generally Yuval Feldman & Doron Teichman, Are All Contractual Obligations Created
Equal?, 100 GEO. L.J. 5 (2011).
71 There is related literature on how framing of contracts affects behavior. See, e.g., Ernst
Fehr, Oliver Hart & Christian Zehnder, Contracts as Reference Points—Experimental Evidence,
101 AM. ECON. REV. 493, 518–22 (2011); Yuval Feldman, Amos Schurr & Doron Teichman,
Reference Points and Contractual Choices: An Experimental Examination, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LE-
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To start, individuals believe that certain behavioral formalities—
signatures and payment—create binding contracts, and they are not
persuaded that contracts result merely from verbal or written language memorializing agreements. That is, promisors and promisees
imagine that a legal contract consists of a schema—the vernacular of
“doing the paperwork,” “getting it in writing,” and “signing on the
dotted line.”72 And, as mentioned above, when parties think they are
in a contract, they are more likely to trust their counterparties and less
likely to walk away.73
But what of recitals and other forms of boilerplate? Experimenters have found that legalese (such as that typically found in an enduser licensing agreement) is less effective at constraining breach than
language that sounds in promise or that encourages the norms of trust
and reciprocity.74 There is also some evidence that particular kinds of
law talk—like liquidated damage clauses—can crowd out ordinary intuitions and decrease commitment to contractual counterparties.75 Together, these experiments do not support the hypothesis that
consideration recitals will provide a cautionary signal and consequently increase the likelihood of commitment to the bargain. At least
with respect to some online experimental subjects, consideration-creating recitals do not appear to be part of the popular schema that
means “legal contract,” and, at best, likely are behaviorally inert. At
worst, given the other findings described above, recitals might crowd
out or otherwise displace relational norms.76
GAL STUD. 512 (2013); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Contracts as Reference Points, 123 Q.J. ECON.
1, 5–13 (2008); Hoffman & Wilkinson-Ryan, Psychology of Contract, supra note 20.
72 Wilkinson-Ryan & Hoffman, Common Sense, supra note 15, at 1297; see also Deborah
A. Schmedemann & Judi McLean Parks, Contract Formation and Employee Handbooks: Legal,
Psychological, and Empirical Analyses, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 647, 673 (1994) (noting that
signature “may be part of the schema of contract” and finding evidence suggesting that it is).
73 Hoffman & Wilkinson-Ryan, Psychology of Contract, supra note 20.
74 Eigen, When and Why Individuals Obey Contracts, supra note 15, at 88. See generally
Zev J. Eigen, An Experimental Test of the Effectiveness of Terms & Conditions (Northwestern
Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 13-32, 2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2338559; Lisa L. Shu, Francesca Gino & Max Bazerman, Dishonest Deed,
Clear Conscience: When Cheating Leads to Moral Disengagement and Motivated Forgetting, 37
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 330, 344 (2011) (showing that reading an honor code
reduces cheating in an unrelated task).
75 Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Do Liquidated Damages Encourage Breach? A Psychological Experiment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 633, 669 (2010). See generally Mark C. Suchman, The Contract as
Social Artifact, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 91, 113 (2003) (describing contextually based understanding of signals sent by legalism).
76 Thus, perhaps legalese codes are a foreign language. Thinking in a foreign language is
debiasing, resulting from a kind of cognitive distancing. We might hypothesize that concentrated
exposure to a legalism in a contract might similarly “debias” parties by encouraging them to
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Recitals disclaiming obligation—such as those common in employee manuals—might have even more perverse effects. They could
signal to parties that the background rules of engagement (which are
relational and trust-based) apply, and thus paradoxically increase the
likelihood of performance.77 Or, as Sidney DeLong has suggested,
contract disclaimers might be so puzzling as to provide no meaningful
signal at all.78
The only extant empirical work on disclaimers focuses on individuals’ hypothetical reactions to disclaimers in the employee manual
context, typically asking if a disclaimer causes subjects to discount the
existence of a legal contract. Thus, Deborah Schmedemann and Judi
McLean Parks, studying a student sample, found that subjects were
less likely to think there was legal breach of a hypothetical employee
manual accompanied by a disclaimer.79 By contrast, jargon (coded the
existence of legal language) resulted in subjects being more likely to
think that the manual was legally enforceable.80 Similarly, Larry DiMatteo, Robert Bird, and Jason Colquitt, surveying undergraduates
about a possible job they would have after graduation from business
school, “educated” them about the legal effect of disclaimers and varied whether subjects saw a disclaimer, among other factors, in a hypothetical manual.81 When so educated, subjects were less likely to
think that breach of the manual’s terms was a wrongful act, because
they were convinced that it “did not deviate substantially from the
legal rules on which they were educated.”82 But, the authors speculated, a disclaimer unaccompanied by an educational program would
be “invidious in nature,”83 as the “cognitive dissonance” between employee-friendly policies and a legalistic disclaimer might “heighten
negative attitudes toward the organization.”84 We are aware of no

treat the contract as an economic exchange rather than as a promise, and consequently become
less likely to perform. See Boaz Keysar, Sayuri L. Hayakawa & Sun Gyu An, The ForeignLanguage Effect: Thinking in a Foreign Tongue Reduces Decision Biases, 23 PSYCHOL. SCI. 661,
667 (2012) (framing effect “disappears” when the problems are presented in a foreign tongue).
77 Cf. Suchman, supra note 75, at 113–14 (“Overall, then, the microsymbolic account of
contract formation depicts contract documents as meaning-laden signs and symbols.”).

R

78

DeLong, supra note 69.

R

79

Schmedemann & Parks, supra note 72, at 676.

R

80

Id.

81

DiMatteo et al., supra note 51, at 465–69 (describing survey).

82

Id. at 471–72.

83

Id. at 472.

84

Id. at 473.
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work examining whether disclaimers had behavioral effects: that is,
whether they increased or decreased contractual commitment.85
That is not to say that all contract language is behaviorally inert
or self-defeating.86 More time spent reading contracts is associated
with an increased likelihood of performance.87 And there is evidence
that the choice between particular contract terms can influence behavior without crowding out moral norms. For example, Yuval Feldman
and his co-authors have recently made an important contribution to
the old debate about the motivating effect of language of good faith
versus specific contract terms. Using a series of experiments that measured subjects’ proficiency at editing of a document, the authors found
that in some contexts, contract language providing specific direction
was more likely to motivate performance than an exhortation to perform in good faith.88
Notably, these studies largely consider the first party, ex ante effects of language. Ex post contract language plays a different, but
nonetheless crucial role by helping decisionmakers attribute moral responsibility. Studies have found that we blame consumers for not
reading long contracts; we think they have consented to terms that
harm them, and we generally conclude that consumers are more to
blame than are firms for bad outcomes from hidden terms in form
contracts.89 As Erik Zacks hypothesizes, contract provisions “can provide attributional ‘clues’ that inform and reassure judicial interpreters
that a particular contracting party is more blameworthy than
another.”90
85 A related paper examines exculpatory clauses and finds that, in hypothetical scenarios,
they can reduce the self-reported likelihood that insured parties would sue even if they think
such clauses are not enforceable. Dennis P. Stolle & Andrew J. Slain, Standard Form Contracts
and Contract Schemas: A Preliminary Investigation of the Effects of Exculpatory Clauses on Consumers’ Propensity to Sue, 15 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 83, 91–93 (1997).
86 Notably, the text above refers to the behavior of unrepresented parties in relatively
smaller stakes contracts, not repeat, sophisticated, commercial players. See generally Daniel
Markovits & Alan Schwartz, The Myth of Efficient Breach: New Defenses of the Expectation
Interest, 97 VA. L. REV. 1939, 1954 n.32 (2011) (discussing how individual and firm behavior
differ respecting contract psychology).
87 Eigen, Fine Print and Performance, supra note 24, at 124, 134–37 (noting overall low
incidence of reading).
88 See Constantine Boussalis, Yuval Feldman & Henry E. Smith, An Experimental Analysis of the Effect of Standards on Compliance and Performance, REG. & GOVERNANCE (forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2539190.
89 MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND
THE RULE OF LAW (2013) (citing Scott Adams, Dilbert (Feb. 23, 2011)); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, A
Psychological Account of Consent to Fine Print, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1745, 1762–67 (2014).
90 Eric A. Zacks, Contracting Blame, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 169, 171 (2012).
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Somewhat in contrast to this complex story about contract terms,
reciprocal gestures appear to powerfully spur contract performance.
Reciprocity norms are implicated in mortgage contracts, in assigned
contracts, and even in divorce settlements.91 Reciprocity appears to
motivate performance even in the formation stage. For example, in a
recent experiment, Tess Wilkinson-Ryan and David Hoffman asked
subjects to imagine buying a car.92 They found that subjects who were
informed that the seller relied on the buyer’s stated intention to
purchase the vehicle (taking a “for sale” sign out of a car window and
having a car for sale detailed) led subjects to feel that the buyer
should not shop around for a better deal.93
Although the literature makes clear that contract norms are contextually dependent,94 the prospects for ordinary recitals of consideration as a pro-contract cautionary device are dim. Such language likely
will be coded as a legalism that is, at best, behaviorally inert and, at
worst, likely to crowd out moral norms. The literature is mixed on the
effects of disclaimers of obligation. While most theorists (and some
employee handbook surveys) suggest that disclaimers reduce the likelihood of commitment, a few scholars have suggested that the reverse
is possible. And, there is evidence that small, contractually-irrelevant
gestures can encourage feelings of reciprocity that motivate
performance.
II. METHODS

AND

RESULTS

A. Recruitment and Descriptive Statistics
A total of 2550 individuals were recruited on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (“MTurk”) to participate in a study asking them to allocate
money between two charities or, in one iteration of the experiment,
between two individuals, in exchange for $1.00.95 We gathered data
91 See Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Transferring Trust: Reciprocity Norms and Assignment of
Contract, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 511, 512 (2012); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Breaching the
Mortgage Contract: The Behavioral Economics of Strategic Default, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1547,
1562–63 (2011); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Jonathan Baron, Moral Judgment and Moral Heuristics
in Breach of Contract, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 405, 410 (2009); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan &
Jonathan Baron, The Effect of Conflicting Moral and Legal Rules on Bargaining Behavior: The
Case of No-Fault Divorce, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 315, 318–19 (2008).
92 Wilkinson-Ryan & Hoffman, Common Sense, supra note 15, at 1293–95.
93 Id.
94 For example, experimental evidence suggests that individuals behave differently depending on the contract counterparty. See Uriel Haran, A Person-Organization Discontinuity in
Contract Perception: Why Corporations Can Get Away with Breaking Contracts but Individuals
Cannot, 59 MGMT. SCI. 2837, 2838–41, 2846 (2013).
95 There is a growing literature on the representativeness of MTurk samples. As compared
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over four total days. There were minor differences between the first
and second day.96 There is no evidence to suggest that the day on
which data was gathered influenced any results reported in this
Article.97
Of the 2550 who accepted the invitation to participate in the
study, nine dropped out before being randomly assigned to any experimental condition. An additional sixty-three responses were dropped
from our analysis because participants used an MTurk identification
number that had participated in research regarding contracts conducted by one of the authors in the past, or did not submit an MTurk
ID at all, or there was no matching Human Intelligence Task (“HIT”)
number. An additional 103 responses were dropped because they
were submitted by duplicate Internet Protocol (“IP”) addresses.98 This
left 2371 total usable responses that could conservatively be ascribed
to different subjects.99 Table 1 provides a snapshot of the respondents’
demographic characteristics.
to college undergraduates, they are more representative, and they tend to pay attention to survey prompts. See Adam J. Berinsky, Michele F. Margolis & Michael W. Sances, Separating the
Shirkers from the Workers? Making Sure Respondents Pay Attention on Self-Administered
Surveys, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 739, 745 (2014); Eyal Peer, Joachim Vosgerau & Alessandro Acquisti, Reputation as a Sufficient Condition for Data Quality on Amazon Mechanical Turk, 46
BEHAV. RES. 1023, 1026 (2013) (high-reputation MTurk workers rarely failed attention checks
and provided high-quality data). But on some tasks MTurkers appear to produce distinctive answers. Yanna Krupnikov & Adam Seth Levine, Cross-Sample Comparisons and External Validity, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL POL. SCI. 59, 69–70, 73, 77 (2014). But cf. Christoph Bartneck, Andreas
Duenser, Elena Moltchanova & Karolina Zawieska, Comparing the Similarity of Responses Received from Studies in Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to Studies Conducted Online and with Direct
Recruitment, 2015 PLOS ONE 10(4): e0121595, 17–18 (finding statistically significant but practically small differences between MTurk and other online samples and no differences with campus
samples on studies evaluating emotional expressions). An emergent issue with MTurk samples is
that it appears that the total number of MTurk survey respondents may be quite small—under
10,000 at any one time. See Neil Stewart et al., The Average Laboratory Samples a Population of
7,300 Amazon Mechanical Turk Workers, 10 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 479, 480 (2015).
This leads to worries about non-naiveté. In fact, links to our survey were posted on a Reddit
subgroup advertising MTurk studies, presumably because the pay we provided was relatively
generous. Phaulo, REDDIT (June 22, 2014), http://www.reddit.com/r/HITsWorthTurkingFor/com
ments/28rq57/us_a_study_about_charitable_giving_behavior_dave/. There is no evidence that
the purpose of the manipulation was revealed, though the existence of multiple conditions was
discoverable.
96 The first day’s survey omitted a question about subjects’ age.
97 Several statistical tests support this. For instance, there is no statistically significant difference in the proportions of subjects who backed out of their commitments (a main outcome
variable) by day (p = .754 mean across day pairwise comparisons).
98 It is possible that two different people used the same IP address. See Bradley Mitchell,
What Is an IP Address Conflict?, LIFEWIRE (July 25, 2016), https://www.lifewire.com/what-is-ipaddress-conflict-818381.
99 Four additional participants dropped out of the study after being randomly assigned to a
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TABLE 1. DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS
Category
Male
Non-White
College Graduate
Some College
Earns less than $100,000
• Between 18–24 years old
• Between 25–34 years old
• Between 35–44 years old
• Between 45–54 years old
• 55 or older
Reported having a “fair amount,” or “extensive
knowledge” of contract law
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PARTICIPANTS

Proportion in Sample
55%
25%
37%
35%
93%
19%
44%
19%
10%
8%
25%

Overall, this sample thus skewed slightly more male, and contained fewer older subjects than the population mean.100 As an interesting comparison, perhaps indicative of the context in which
questions like these are asked on surveys, every year Eigen surveys
entering students at various law schools, using the same question
asked of participants in this study, to self-report their knowledge and
experience with contract law in the United States. Approximately 2%
of those hundreds of entering 1L law students self-report having either a “fair amount” or “extensive knowledge” of contract law.
B. Experiment 1
Our first experiment asked participants to allocate two real dollars either to a real food pantry or to a real homeless shelter. This was
the text they saw:

condition: one from the recital plus condition, one from the recital condition, and two from the
control condition.
100 Compared to national samples, MTurk respondents are “wealthier, younger, more educated, less racially diverse, and more Democratic than national samples” and less religiously
affiliated. Andrew R. Lewis et al., The (Non) Religion of Mechanical Turk Workers, 54 J. SCI.
STUDY RELIGION 419, 420 (2015). According to the census, around 34% of the adult American
population is older than 55; 20% is 45–54; 18% is 35–44; 18% is 25–34; and 9% is 19–25. Fortynine percent are male. See 2010 Census Briefs: Age and Sex Composition, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU
1–2 (2011), http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-03.pdf.
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We want to know how much money people think should go to FOOD
PANTRIES versus HOMELESS SHELTERS.
• FOOD PANTRIES: distribute food to low income and unemployed
households, to relieve situations of emergency and distress.
• HOMELESS SHELTERS: provide safe and sanitary housing for the low
and moderate income citizens and shelter for homeless persons, to
alleviate such conditions and to encourage economic development.
We picked a real food pantry and a real homeless shelter. We will not reveal the
names of the organizations we have chosen, but they have similar yearly
operating budgets, and both were recently favorably audited by experts.
We will refer to them as “Food Pantry” and “Homeless Shelter,” respectively, for
the purposes of this study.
IMPORTANT:
You will receive $1.00 for participating in this study. We will be asking you to
divide $2 between two charities.

After the introductory text, sliding radio buttons permitted subjects to allocate money to one or the other charity. A graphic display
at the bottom of participants’ screens depicted their allocation (Figure
1), as well as a box indicating “Your Payment.” This served as a visual
reminder of how much money they were receiving and how much they
were agreeing to allocate between the two options provided. The payment visualization was programmed to update in real time according
to the participants’ allocations.
FIGURE 1. REAL TIME UPDATING VISUAL AID
MONETARY ENDOWMENT

TO

SUBJECTS

OF

Participants were then randomly assigned to one of four conditions. The first condition began:101
101 For subjects on the first day, as we have noted, the extra bonus payments were $1.00,
not $0.25, bringing the total pay to $2.00, not $1.25.
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THIS IS IMPORTANT! PLEASE READ:
• You will receive $1.00 for participating in this study. (You already knew
that).
• In addition to that, you will receive another $0.25 (bringing your total pay
to $1.25) for clicking the box below, acknowledging your
COMMITMENT to the allocation of money to the two charities you
made (as shown below to remind you of your selections).

• You also acknowledge that the additional $0.25 is good and valid
consideration.

After reading that text, participants in this condition had to click
two boxes. The first box acknowledged that the nominal sum they received was “sufficient consideration.” The second box acknowledged
a commitment to allocate the money to the two charities “as shown
below,” where we displayed the graphic showing their allocation and
the amount of money that was immediately added to their personal
“bank.” For ease of reference, we refer to this condition as the “recital
plus endowment,” or merely “recital plus,” because subjects were endowed with a bonus sum of money visually depicted as being added to
their “bank” when they clicked the boxes. In other words, we paid
subjects an additional amount of money to seal the promise—their
performance was already paid for as a part of the natural exchange
constituting the study.102 Importantly, the illustration in Figure 1 updated in real time to demonstrate to participants the exact moment
when they were endowed with additional money. The window showing “your payment” updated to include the additional money at the
precise time when it would have been transferred as if this were a
face-to-face interaction.
We varied the bonus amounts over the course of the experiment:
ninety participants saw the $1.00 additional amount; 254 participants
saw the $0.25 amount; and an additional ninety-five saw $0.05 as the
bonus amount.103 We categorized the participants who saw the $1.00
102 Some might think of the $0.25 (for most subjects) to $1.00 (for a minority) bonus payment as equivalent to “nominal” consideration in the classic sense. Given that the recruitment
payment was $1.00, however, even an additional $0.25 enriched participants by 25%, which is
different from the classic $1.00 nominal payment on a large underlying contract or gift. The
better view understands this $0.25 payment as a way to increase the salience of the consideration, or to endow the recipient with a sum that then engenders a feeling of reciprocity. Daniel
Markovits suggested to us that this could be regarded as a second promise. A future iteration of
this experiment might therefore test the difference between back-out rates in the recital plus
money condition and a condition in which a second promise is made without additional endowment of money.
103 In the book naming experiment, described below, all 148 participants saw the $0.25
amount.
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and the $0.25 bonus together for analytical purposes, and kept these
separate from those receiving a $0.05 bonus. In the second condition,
participants disclaimed contractual obligation:
THIS IS IMPORTANT! PLEASE READ:
• You will receive $1.00 for participating in this study. (You already knew
that).
• By clicking the box below, you acknowledge that your allocation does not
create a legally binding contract.

Participants in this condition also clicked two boxes—the first acknowledging that “we have not entered into a contract” and the second indicating that “I do not intend to form such a contract.” We refer
to this condition as the “disclaimer” treatment. It is intended to simulate situations in which parties are entering into a transactional exchange, but one of the parties expressly announces that no contractual
relationship is being formed. This is common in employment, where
employers routinely require employees to sign a form acknowledging
that a handbook detailing their employment terms does not create a
contract.104 It is also growing increasingly more common for organizations to denounce contractual relationships in other settings such as
telecommunications.105
The third condition is intended to function as a naked recital of
consideration:
THIS IS IMPORTANT! PLEASE READ:
• You will receive $1.00 for participating in this study. (You already knew
that.)
• By clicking the box below, you acknowledge your COMMITMENT to
the allocation of the money to the two charities you made (as shown
below).
• You also acknowledge that you did this in exchange for good and valid
consideration.

Participants again clicked a box acknowledging that this is “good
and valid consideration,” and a box acknowledging their allocation of
the money to the two charities. This, again, was accompanied by a
graphic depiction of their allocation and the money in their “bank,”
which here did not change in value as we did not endow the subjects
104 See, e.g., BOSTON UNIV., EMPLOYEE HANDBOOK: POLICIES FOR NON-REPRESENTED,
NON-FACULTY PERSONNEL 3 (2015), https://www.bu.edu/hr/documents/employee-handbook.pdf.
105 See Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, Exit from Contract, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 151,
152 (2014).
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with additional money. This condition is called the “recital” condition.
One of the primary goals of this experiment is to observe differences
(if any) between this naked recital condition and the first “recital plus
money” condition.
The fourth and last condition is the control. Subjects merely completed a “CAPTCHA” and moved on.106 Another primary goal of this
study is to determine if subjects behaved differently in either the first
or third conditions than this condition. Here, subjects may infer the
contractual nature of the primary exchange, but are not prompted to
click anything. There is no primed augmented salience of the legality
of the exchange, the way there is in the other conditions. However,
the bargain contained within itself the seeds of natural consideration—subjects’ service promise to divide the charitable pot was motivated by our promise to pay them $1.00; our promise to pay was
motivated by their promise to divide. The control thus could be regarded as an ordinary bargain.107
All participants then completed a filler task consisting of self-reporting of several validated psychometric measures. Some of the questions were about self-reporting happiness, sadness, how loved, lazy,
pessimistic, ignorant, funny, or confident they are. The other two filler
tasks doubled as ways of gathering information on individual states.
Specifically, subjects answered two batteries of questions that comprised the Extreme Relational Orientation scale (“ERO”),108 and the
Extreme Agentic Orientation scale (“EAO”).109 Both are validated
measures. The ERO is more commonly referred to as the personality
106 A CAPTCHA, for those who are the kind of web surfer likely to fail a CAPTCHA, is a
“Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart.” See Jonathan
Zittrain, Privacy 2.0, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 65, 76 nn.35–36 (describing CAPTCHA history).
107 Some may incorrectly conclude that because the context of the first experiment was
charitable gifts, there was no consideration. But what we were really purchasing here was the
subjects’ time and the ability to observe their behavior: we really were motivated by the promise
that they made to divide the money between charities. They, in turn, were motivated by the
money they earned from the researchers. The promises mutually induced, forming natural consideration. The fact that the underlying subject matter of the service was “charitable allocation”
as opposed to “painting” or “writing law review articles” or whatever else individuals do for
money is, from a doctrinal perspective, irrelevant.
108 See Emily T. Amanatullah, Michael W. Morris & Jared R. Curhan, Negotiators Who
Give Too Much: Unmitigated Communion, Relational Anxieties, and Economic Costs in Distributive and Integrative Bargaining, 95 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 723, 726 (2008); Heidi L.
Fritz & Vicki S. Helgeson, Distinctions of Unmitigated Communion from Communion: Self-Neglect and Overinvolvement with Others, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 121, 123–40 (1998).
109 See Vicki S. Helgeson & Heidi L. Fritz, Unmitigated Agency and Unmitigated Communion: Distinctions from Agency and Communion, 33 J. RES. PERSONALITY 131 (1999).
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trait of “unmitigated communion.”110 Unmitigated communion is a focus on and involvement with others to the exclusion of the self.111 The
EAO is a validated scaled measure of a personality trait commonly
called “unmitigated agency.”112 Unmitigated agency “is a focus on the
self to the exclusion of others . . . [that] includes being hostile, cynical,
greedy, and arrogant . . . [and involves a generally] negative view of
the world and of other people.”113 These measures were used as filler
tasks because they could plausibly be regarded as measures of personality traits associated with preferences about allocation decision rendering, without tipping our hand when what we are actually interested
in is their commitment to their original allocations under various contract frames or lack thereof.
After they completed the filler tasks, participants were shown a
new screen:
We have received and evaluated your responses.
In light of them, we have another question for you:

The amounts you have agreed to give the charities are shown in the boxes below.
Would you like to carry out this distribution between the charities?
Or would you like to back out of your bargain? If you do, you can change the
distribution between the charities and take some or all of the $2.00 for yourself.

Participants were thus tempted to back out of their bargain and
keep some or all of the money they had allocated to charity for themselves. Participants who elected to back out of their bargains were
prompted on the next screen to reallocate money among the food
pantry, homeless shelter, and now, themselves, using sliders ranging
from $0.00 to $2.00.114 The bank at the bottom of the screen reflected
the new allocations in real time. Finally, we completed the survey with
a series of demographic questions and prompts that asked about subjects’ experiences with contracting and related questions.
110 See generally Vicki S. Helgeson & Heidi L. Fritz, A Theory of Unmitigated Communion,
2 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 173 (1998) (discussing the “cognitive and behavioral
features of unmitigated communion”).
111

Id. at 174.

112

See generally Helgeson & Fritz, supra note 109.

113

Id. at 132.

114

A new slider labeled “keep for yourself” distinguished the task from the first round.
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In the next Section, we describe the results of the experiments.
First, we explain the main result of the study—the effects of contract
framing on non-commitment behavior. Then, we describe the effects
of framing on the magnitude of breach. Lastly, we discuss individuallevel differences and present a full set of logistic models incorporating
both covariates and conditional assignment.
C. Results of Experiment 1
1. Does Contract Framing Affect the Likelihood that Individuals
Will Back Out of Their Commitments?
Participants who elected to back out of their commitments were
prompted on the screen after they made this decision to reallocate
money among the food pantry, homeless shelter, and, now, themselves. The main outcome variable of interest is therefore subjects’
election to back out of their initial commitments. Table 2 depicts the
rates at which individuals backed out, by random experimentally assigned condition. Our main predictions were that the endowment of
additional small sums of money along with a recitation of consideration would produce an increased likelihood of adherence to participants’ agreements, even when given the opportunity to profit from
backing out, and even in a known quasi-“real” experimental setting, in
which subjects might feel less obligated than in real world settings.
TABLE 2. BACK-OUT RATES

BY

CONDITIONAL ASSIGNMENT

Condition

Mean

SD

N

Recital + $
Disclaimer
Recital
Control
Total

36.44%
41.37%
43.76%
46.89%
42.57%

0.482
0.493
0.497
0.500
0.495

343
423
441
482
1689

As shown in Tables 2 and 3, evidence from the experiment supports our main hypothesis that endowing people with money augments commitment behavior. The lowest back-out rate for all subjects
is 36.44%; this is the rate for participants randomly assigned to the
consideration plus money condition. This rate is statistically significantly lower than the control (CAPTCHA) condition’s rate (46.89%;
p = .003).115
115 The recital-plus-money rate is also statistically significantly lower than the rate at which
participants backed out in the recital condition (43.76%; p = .04). However, the back-out rate for
participants in the recital-plus-money condition is not statistically significantly lower than the
rate for subjects in the disclaimer condition (41.37%; p = .165).
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We also hypothesized that the recitation of consideration absent
the endowment of money would generate no different commitment
behavior than the control condition, which again was an ordinary bargained-for exchange. Evidence supports this hypothesis. As shown in
Table 2, the percentage of participants who backed out in the recital
condition (43.76%) is not statistically different from the percentage
who backed out in the disclaimer condition (41.37%; p = .48). Participants in the recital condition backed out at a non-statistically significant rate as compared with the control (CAPTCHA) condition
participants as well (46.89%; p = .341). In other words, a recital of
consideration on its own, without additional endowment of money,
did little to motivate individuals to remain committed to their original
deals, beyond that which could produce such commitment behavior
yieldable from any and every alternative framing.
Lastly, subjects backed out of their commitments in the contract
disclaimer condition at a lower rate (41.37%) than subjects assigned to
the control condition (46.89%; p < .096).116 This suggests that language
alone without endowing money can influence commitment behaviors—but not in the way that theorists or jurists might have predicted.
As discussed below, however, it is possible that the effect of disclaiming the existence of contract on commitment behavior is mediated by
other variables.
TABLE 3. PROPORTION TEST COMPARISONS ACROSS EXPERIMENTAL
CONDITIONS
Comparison
Recital + $
36.44%
Recital + $
36.44%
Recital + $
36.44%
Disclaimer
41.37%
Disclaimer
41.37%
Recital
43.76%

116

vs.
vs.
vs.
vs.
vs.
vs.

p-value
Disclaimer
41.37%
Recital
43.76%
Control
46.89%
Recital
43.76%
Control
46.89%
Control
46.89%

0.1647
0.04
0.003
0.477
0.0955
0.341

The effect is only statistically significant at the 90% threshold.
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Taken together, evidence from this experiment supports the notion that endowment is an important component in inducing reciprocal commitment behavior. However, that reciprocal commitment
might be just as evocable by signaling the absence of contract—something that could prompt individuals to frame the exchange as a relational commitment instead of a market exchange, as other work
suggests.117
Lastly, for the 95 participants who saw the bonus as $0.05, a more
symbolic amount, 44.2% of them backed out (standard deviation
(“SD”) = .50), as compared with the 36.4% back-out rate for participants who saw the $1.00 or $0.25 bonus amount. This difference of
almost 8% is not statistically significant (p = .17), although we would
not expect there to be a significant difference between these rates
given the small sample size and power expectations. The value of the
additional subject pool at the much lower bonus amount is to test the
directionality of the distributions.
2. Does Contract Framing Affect the Magnitude of NonCommitment Behavior?
Once they elected to back out of their commitment, participants
were allowed to reallocate to themselves the money that they previously committed to allocate to charity.118 Table 4 shows the mean dollar values subjects took for themselves by conditional assignment.
Across all conditions, the mean reallocation amount was $1.79
(n = 719; SD = .44). There was no statistically significant disparity
across conditional assignment on the magnitude of non-commitment
behavior in this study. The only difference that approached statistical
significance at the 90% level is the recital plus money condition
($1.84) compared to the recital ($1.75; p = .10). It is interesting that
the lowest magnitude of selfish behavior observed among subjects
who elected to back out of their commitment was the level for those in
the recitation condition. That is, those who backed out in a condition
in which there was a formal recitation of consideration absent an endowment of additional money associated with the recitation took less
for themselves (away from charities) than in other conditions. Because this difference is not statistically significant, however, this observation is merely suggestive and speculative. In the end, the
experiment offers no evidence to support the hypothesis that there are
117
118

See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
See supra Section II.B.
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differences in the magnitudes of post-breach behaviors across the experimental conditions.
TABLE 4. MEAN DOLLAR VALUES OF REALLOCATION
ACROSS EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS
Condition

N

Recital + $
Disclaimer
Recital
Control
Total

125
175
193
226
719

$
$
$
$
$

Mean

SD

1.84
1.75
1.75
1.81
1.79

0.428
0.448
0.451
0.415
0.436

TO

SELF

3. Are Individual Attributes Correlated with Commitment
Behaviors?
Consistent with prior research, individual level attributes matter
in predicting variation in commitment behaviors.119 Specifically, more
men back out of their established commitments than women (51% of
men, as compared to 31% of women; p < .001). Thirty-five percent of
subjects with the highest educational attainment (greater than a fouryear college degree) back out of their initial commitments, as compared to 44% of subjects with lesser educational attainment (p = .02).
And, not surprisingly, people with low ERO scores backed out at a
higher rate than those with high ERO scores (49% of low ERO participants compared to 39% of high ERO participants; p < .001). Similarly, participants with high EAO scores backed out at a higher rate
than those with low EAO scores (46% of high EAO participants compared to 37% of low EAO participants; p = .002). Reported income
level mattered in predicting back-out rates for participants as well, as
Table 5 reflects. Demographic variables without any statistically significant correlation with back-out rates include race/ethnicity (p = .19)
and reported knowledge of contract law (p = .23).
TABLE 5. MEAN BACK-OUT RATES BY REPORTED
HOUSEHOLD INCOME
Reported Income
<$10k
$10–19k
$20–29k
$30–39k
$40–49k
$50–74k
$75–99k

Mean

SD

N

56.16%
47.52%
41.13%
43.51%
43.52%
36.26%
35.80%

0.498
0.501
0.493
0.497
0.497
0.482
0.481

146
202
282
239
193
273
162

119 Zev J. Eigen, The Devil in the Details: The Interrelationship Among Citizenship, Rule of
Law and Form-Adhesive Contracts, 41 CONN. L. REV. 381, 421–26 (2008).
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$100–150k
+$150k

35.00%
32.00%

0.480
0.476

80
25

Total

42.13%

0.494

1602

We also examined whether, and to what extent, individual characteristics correlated with the amount of money participants reclaimed
for themselves among those who backed out of their commitments.
On average: men claimed more money for themselves than women by
$0.11 (p = .002); low ERO participants claimed $0.16 more than high
ERO participants (p < .001); and high EAO participants claimed $0.07
more than low EAO participants (p = .06). None of the other demographic characteristics were statistically significantly correlated with
the amount of money claimed.120
Age and cohort effects are worth noting separately from other
demographic covariates. There is a strong, robust negative correlation
between participants’ reported age and their likelihood of keeping
their expressed charitable contribution commitments across all experimental conditions. As Table 6 shows, older participants are significantly less likely to back out of their commitments across all
conditions. Fifty-four percent of the 274 participants aged 18–24
backed out of their commitments, as compared to 24% of those 45–54
(n = 135), and only 22% of those aged 55–64 (n = 82). There were only
eighteen participants aged 65–74; only five of those eighteen backed
out.
TABLE 6. PERCENTAGE OF SUBJECTS WHO BACK OUT
COMMITMENT BY AGE
Age

N

Mean

SD

18–24
25–34
35–44
45–54
55–64
65–74

274
582
242
135
82
18

54.01%
46.74%
36.36%
24.44%
21.95%
27.78%

0.499
0.499
0.482
0.431
0.416
0.461

Total

1333

42.31%

0.494

OF

120 The 553 white participants who backed out of their commitments claimed an average of
$1.79 (SD = .43) for themselves. Including Asians, there are 166 minority participants who
backed out of their commitments. Their mean amount claimed was $1.76 (SD = .45). The difference is not statistically significant (p = .39). If one excludes Asians from the tally of minority
participants, there are then 105 remaining minorities who backed out of their commitments, with
a mean dollar value claimed for themselves of $1.71 (SD = .48). The difference of $0.08 (whites
claim more for themselves than minorities) is statistically significant at the 90% threshold, but
not at the standard 95% threshold (p = .07).
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The overall inverse relationship between commitment behavior
and age is apparent in Table 6 and Figure 2 below. Across all conditions, a one-unit increase in participant’s age bracket is associated
with a 31% decrease in the likelihood of backing out of one’s commitment. Within any age bracket, given the small sample sizes and power
constraints, it should not be surprising that few of the comparisons
across conditional assignment are statistically significant. The exceptions are as follows. In the 35–44 age bracket, the recital plus endowment condition is different from the disclaimer condition (p = .09),
and the recital plus endowment condition is also statistically significantly different from the control condition (p = .06). In the 45–54
bracket, the disclaimer condition is statistically different from the control condition (p = .04), and the recital condition is different from the
control condition as well (p = .06).
FIGURE 2. BACK-OUT RATES BY AGE
ASSIGNMENT

AND BY

CONDITIONAL

What is perhaps most interesting is the comparison of the differences between older and younger participants’ reactions to the experimental contractual framings. For ease of interpretation of results, one
may dichotomize the age data into participants under 35, and those 35
or older: 35.2% of the participants are 35 or older and 65% are 18–34
years old. Not surprisingly from the information already described,
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the commitment rates for these two groups are starkly different. The
mean back-out rate for all subjects under 35 years old is 48.5%
(SD = .5) as compared with 31.2% (SD = .46) for participants 35 and
over (p < .001).
Table 7 shows the commitment rates by experimental condition
and by age (dichotomized). Younger subjects are consistently more
likely to back out of their bargains than older subjects. The recital plus
endowment condition induced 47% of subjects 18–34 to back out of
their bargain as compared to only 28.5% of participants 35 or older.
This difference is highly statistically significant (p < .001). In the recital condition, the difference is also significant (p = .02), and that difference is significant in the control condition as well (p < .001).
However, the difference in back-out rates is not statistically significant
for participants in the disclaimer condition. There, the back-out rates
for younger (46%) and older (37%) participants are not statistically
significantly different (p = .105). Taken together, these findings raise
questions about possible cohort effects in the way in which participants reacted to the contract frames presented. The point is simply
that there is some initial evidence to support the hypothesis that there
are cohort effects that should not be ignored, especially when considering the effect of online consideration and form.
TABLE 7. DIFFERENCES IN BACK-OUT RATES BY CONDITIONAL
ASSIGNMENT, BY DIFFERENCES IN AGE
(OVER/UNDER THIRTY-FIVE)
Condition
Recital + $

Disclaimer

Recital

Control

Total

Mean
SD
N
Mean
SD
N
Mean
SD
N
Mean
SD
N
Mean
SD
N

18–34

35 +

Total

46.67%
0.501
150
46.30%
0.500
162
52.12%
0.501
165
54.59%
0.499
196
50.22%
0.500
673

28.50%
0.453
193
37.42%
0.485
163
39.89%
0.491
183
37.70%
0.486
191
35.75%
0.480
730

36.44%
0.482
343
41.85%
0.494
325
45.69%
0.499
348
46.25%
0.499
387
42.69%
0.495
1403

Proportion
test p-value
p < .001

0.105

0.02

p < .001

p < .001

Lastly, in the interest of comprehensively displaying results that
may be useful in evaluating the findings described, Table 8 reports the
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results of a set of nested logistic models evaluating the effect of
covariates on the odds of backing out. Table 8 shows what has already
been discussed about the robust effect of being female on commitment behavior. Women back out of their commitments at nearly half
the rate of men. Similarly, reporting greater income is associated with
greater commitment rates, as is having a high ERO score. Lastly, as
discussed above, the older the subject, the greater the commitment
behaviors observed in this set of experiments.
TABLE 8. LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF BACK-OUT RATES
COVARIATES (ODDS RATIOS REPORTED)

ON

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.437***
(0.0437)

0.437***
(0.0453)

0.465***
(0.0497)

0.564***
(0.0684)

1.059
(0.118)

1.096
(0.128)

1.095
(0.129)

1.036
(0.140)

Education (ordinal)

0.972
(0.0425)

0.961
(0.0425)

0.967
(0.0478)

Income (ordinal)

0.894***
(0.0228)

0.896***
(0.0230)

0.899***
(0.0259)

Contact Knowledge (ordinal)

0.940*
(0.0330)

0.935*
(0.0351)

ERO

0.708***
(0.0573)

0.701***
(0.0650)

EAO

0.981
(0.0842)

0.925
(0.0879)

Female
Minority Status

Age (ordinal)
Constant
Observations

0.753***
(0.0404)
1.034
(0.0724)

1.606***
(0.260)

4.263***
(1.532)

6.737***
(2.808)

1784

1689

1689

1353

std errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

D. Experiment 2: Are Demographic Effects an Artifact?
Research has demonstrated a connection between covariates,
such as gender and income level, and charitable giving.121 Given that
our initial setup for this experiment invokes charitable giving preferences, and, as discussed above, being female, older, and reporting
higher income are associated with augmented commitment behaviors,
we conducted a follow-on study with a smaller sample aimed at seeing
121 See, e.g., Christopher J. Einolf, Gender Differences in the Correlates of Volunteering and
Charitable Giving, 40 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 1092, 1102–06 (2011).
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if the covariate results hold or diverge when the decision process has
nothing to do with charity, and is instead based on a quasi-anonymous
market exchange.
The “book naming study” replicated the design described above,
except instead of choosing between two charities to receive a payout,
subjects chose between two individuals named “Jake” and “Dave”
who had each proposed titles for a forthcoming book.122 In this design,
subjects were expected to perceive this task as adjudicating between
two real marketing professionals’ ideas for a book. To augment the
salience of the choice, and to replicate the realness of the monetary
allotment in the charitable giving studies, we informed subjects that
Dave or Jake would be paid based on participants’ allotments. The
experimental setup was otherwise identical to that described above,
substituting “book namers” or “Dave” or “Jake” in place of the charitable names and references in the experiment.
First, proportion tests confirm that there are no statistically significant differences between subjects’ commitment behaviors in the charitable giving experiment versus the commitment behaviors of subjects
in the book naming experimental group. Table 9 below reports the
back-out rates by experimental group, and by conditional assignment.
It also reports the p-values for proportionality tests by conditional assignment. None are statistically significant.
TABLE 9. COMPARISON

OF

BACK-OUT RATES
GROUP

Charitable Giving

BY

EXPERIMENTAL

Book Naming

Mean

SD

N

Mean

SD

N

Proportion
test p-value

Recital + $
Disclaimer
Recital
Control

36.44%
41.37%
43.76%
46.89%

0.482
0.493
0.497
0.500

343
423
441
482

42.57%
41.78%
36.73%
45.14%

0.496
0.495
0.484
0.4999

148
146
147
144

0.2
0.93
0.13
0.71

Total

42.57%

0.495

1689

41.54%

0.493

585

0.66

Condition

Second, we replicated the nested logit models just for subjects in
the book naming study. The results are reported in Table 10. There
are no differences between the effects of the covariates reported in
the charitable giving experiments as compared to the effects of the
covariates reported in the book naming study. Or to put it differently,
we found no evidence that changing the setting of the experiment
122

To be clear: Jake and Dave are the authors!
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from charitable giving to commercial services had appreciable effects
on the age and gender effects described above.
TABLE 10. LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF BACK-OUT RATES ON
COVARIATES (ODDS RATIOS REPORTED) BOOK NAMING
SUBJECTS ONLY
Female
Minority Status

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.633***
(0.107)
0.925
(0.187)

0.620***
(0.108)
0.894
(0.187)
1.089
(0.0829)
1.005
(0.0426)

0.619***
(0.110)
0.882
(0.187)
1.110
(0.0859)
1.010
(0.0432)
0.842**
(0.0603)
1.119
(0.154)
1.340*
(0.204)

0.909
(0.115)
585

0.680
(0.189)
561

0.364*
(0.216)
561

0.665**
(0.120)
0.786
(0.170)
1.129
(0.0887)
1.014
(0.0437)
0.849**
(0.0613)
1.127
(0.156)
1.283
(0.196)
0.800***
(0.0639)
0.503
(0.305)
561

Education (ordinal)
Income (ordinal)
Contact Knowledge (ordinal)
ERO
EAO
Age (ordinal)
Constant
Observations
std errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

III. CONSIDERATION, FORM,

AND

BEHAVIOR

In this Part, we discuss the implications of the studies presented
above for contract doctrine and theory, and suggest directions for future research.
A. Recitals, Anti-Recitals, and Reciprocity
1. Modernizing Recitals
Fuller thought recitals induced deliberation by making readers
aware of the imminence of law. On its face and in its time, this hypothesis was plausible. Though recitals of consideration may appear as
gibberish to lay readers, they might nonetheless have meaning. As
Mark Suchman persuasively argues, “aspects of contract structure and
chunks of contract language become ideograms, representing concepts
and postures that the parties cannot or will not explicitly verbalize.”123
Fuller hypothesized that recitals worked just this way—they signaled
123

Suchman, supra note 75, at 112 (footnote omitted).

R
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something to the reader (“Stop! The Law is upon you!”)—even
though only attentive first year contracts law student readers are able
to explain what “adequate consideration hereby received” means.
Fuller’s theories harmonize with the broader idea advanced by
many scholars that individuals tend to comply with laws regarded as
legitimate.124 The greater the perceived legitimacy, the greater the
likelihood of conforming behavior.125 “Consideration” or other legally
valenced symbols are supposed to signal to individuals that a privately
made instrument of law (a contract) bears the seal of the law’s formal
approval, and hence the authority of legitimate law stands behind it.
As we said, it is possible that ordinary citizens in the 1940s did
have this kind of ideographic experience when “reading” a recital of
consideration. If recitals, like seals, were then “symbol[s] in the popular mind of legalism and weightiness”126 it would have been immaterial that no one understood what they precisely meant. And perhaps
contract language had a distinctive and symbolic meaning in 1941.
Written contracts were far rarer than they are now, and the legal profession (and law) retained a degree of mystery and prestige that seems
all but inconceivable today.127 We cannot know if lay readers experienced recitals as Fuller thought they did, though surely he was better
positioned than we are to bear witness.
But readers might have doubted, even before reading this Article,
that modern contracting parties (and our experimental subjects)
would so clearly connect recitals with “law.” Contracts are now ubiquitous, and, as such, have lost their power to awe.128 Most parties exSee generally PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STOEVERYDAY LIFE (1998) (qualitative accounts of compliance and defiance with law);
Kathryn Abrams, Extraordinary Measures: Protesting Rule of Law Violations After Bush v.
Gore, 21 LAW & PHIL. 165 (2002) (discussing compliance with politicized court decisions); Eigen,
When and Why Individuals Obey Contracts, supra note 15 (negotiation made contractual compliance more likely).
125 EWICK & SILBEY, supra note 124; TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 3
(2006) (“[E]xplor[ing] the everyday behavior of citizens toward the law and examin[ing] why
people obey or disobey it.”); Robert J. Bies & Tom R. Tyler, The “Litigation Mentality” in Organizations: A Test of Alternative Psychological Explanations, 4 ORG. SCI. 352, 352 (1993)
(“[I]dentify[ing] different psychological factors that could explain why employees consider suing
their employers.”).
126 Fuller, supra note 1, at 800.
127 Even in 1977, “almost 75 percent of [the poll] respondents believed the legal profession
had either very great or considerable prestige.” Amy E. Black & Stanley Rothman, Shall We Kill
All the Lawyers First?: Insider and Outsider Views of the Legal Profession, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 835, 850 (1998). By 1997, half of respondents thought lawyers had “either some or hardly
any prestige.” Id.
128 This account is like Melvin Eisenberg’s discussion of the decline of the symbolic power
124

RIES FROM
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perience contract terms as adhesive lists that get in the way of the
desired product or service, rather than as a dickered for memorialization of bilateral promises. It is not merely that no one reads contracts,
it is that everyone knows that no one reads contracts. That is, the idea
that particular terms in a contract might connote the mystery of law
seems increasingly like a joke.129
It should then come as little surprise that we found no evidence
that recitals change contracting behavior. The real question is: what
does this absence of evidence imply for doctrine? The immediate
temptation, of course, is to declare that naked recitals of intent or of
consideration should have no effect—throwing out recitals in the options context,130 as well as the UWOA and the doctrine of the plurality
of states.131 After all, if such recitals do not induce deliberation and
thus promise keeping, what good are they?
But this easy answer is at best premature. For one, as we discuss
below, there are limits to the generalizability of the experimental results we have presented here, and further research in various contexts
would be necessary to prove that recitals never induce circumspection
and a feeling of contractual obligation. For instance, perhaps recitals
induce circumspection where there is no underlying bargained-for exchange—a more classic gift context. Or perhaps recitals retain their
symbolic power in paper contracts, even as they have lost it online.132
Additionally, there should be limits placed on the degree to
which empirical evidence like this is applied at all in the quest to inform doctrine. In an area of law like contracts, doctrine heavily relies
on the law’s interpretation of what is reasonable for contracting parties to understand. We believe empirical analysis should inform this
interpretation because it is better than the alternative—judges applying their own naı̈ve subjective assessments of “reasonableness” on litiof the seal, which once was a “natural formality” attended by actual hot wax, but later became a
mere notation in the margin of the document: “L.S.” Eisenberg, supra note 53, at 660. Eisenberg
points out that few “promisors today have even the vaguest idea of the significance of such
words, letters, or signs, if they notice them at all.” Id.
129 Popular culture’s perspective on contracting is instructive. See, e.g., South Park:
HUMANCENTiPAD (Parker-Stone Studios television broadcast Apr. 27, 2011).
130 But cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87(1)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (declaring that option contracts are enforceable, even absent bargained-for consideration, if they
are “in writing and signed by the offeror, recite[ ] a purported consideration for the making of
the offer, and propose[ ] an exchange on fair terms within a reasonable time”).
131 See supra note 39–40 and accompanying text.
132 Individuals do think putting deals in writing creates legal obligation. See Stolle & Slain,
supra note 85; Wilkinson-Ryan & Hoffman, Common Sense, supra note 15. Might they consequently believe that recitals on paper are meaningful but those online are not?
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gants. Even if based on significant thought on the matter, personal
experience, and observation of numerous litigants, judges are subject
to biases and are unlikely to hold views representative of their litigants under all circumstances. It is a relatively new idea to use data to
inform doctrine, however, and caution should be taken, especially in
instances like this in which the data are preliminary and not likely
sufficient to form the basis on which to ground large-scale
amendments.
Another reason to resist upturning recital doctrine is that formalities have evidentiary functions as well as cautionary ones.133 Even
when consideration recitals do not check inconsiderate action by
promisees, they do help fact finders by demarcating enforceable
promises. On this reading, consideration recitals would create enforceable bargains even when they left the modal reader nonplussed.
They would act purely as legal fictions.
The danger with this approach is that it leaves some promisees
open to exploitative behavior: legal fictions are most often understood
as such by sophisticated parties, who might be able to use them to
create contractual obligation where the untutored would be surprised
to find it. Perhaps, then, courts should not reject recitals but instead
modernize them. What is needed is a set of symbols—artificial enforcement markers—to help today’s parties understand that they are
entering into contracts. Determining the right modern symbolic gestures that connote seriousness and obligation is a hard, empirical project. Possibilities might include scanning fingerprints, new digital seals,
or even artificial eyes to produce a feeling of being watched.134 The
point would be to find a formal gesture cleanly signaling the “division
between the legal and the non-legal” in a way that would be obvious
to even the most inattentive web surfer.135
2. Folk Wisdom and Nominal Consideration
Our finding that small bonus payments motivate keeping bargains may help to explain an otherwise puzzling aspect of contracting
practice. Though the Restatement (Second) disdains nominal consideration, casebooks are full of examples of lay people apparently thinking that small payments attending the bargain means that a “contract”
has formed. Consider Lucy v. Zehmer.136 In Lucy, plaintiff, W.O.
133
134
135
136

Fuller, supra note 1, at 800.
See generally Calo, supra note 25, at 1038–41 (discussing psychological notice).
Fuller, supra note 1, at 803.
84 S.E.2d 516 (Va. 1954).

R
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Lucy, induced defendant, A.H. Zehmer, to enter into a handwritten
contract (on the back of a restaurant check) to sell the latter’s family
farm for $50,000.137 Zehmer, allegedly perceiving the transaction as a
joke, signed the contract and prevailed on his wife, Ida, to sign away
her rights as well.138 When he returned the “contract” to Lucy, Lucy
attempted to “bind the bargain” with a symbolic $5.00.139 Zehmer, according to Lucy, refused the $5.00, allegedly saying: “You don’t need
to give me any money, you got the agreement there signed by both of
us.”140
Though Lucy is often taught to contracts students to illustrate the
objectivity of assent in contract law,141 for us the more interesting aspect of the case is how it illustrates what ordinary individuals think
about formation. Lucy—who turned out to be a relatively sophisticated lumberman and land speculator—apparently believed that the
exchange of $5.00 would solemnize a $50,000 contract.142 Zehmer—on
Lucy’s account—thought the money unnecessary because a contract
already existed. But, according to a disinterested waitress, Zehmer refused the $5.00 because he was afraid it would create a bargain: he
turned it down “because [Lucy] didn’t have enough money to pay for
his property, and [he] wasn’t going to sell his farm.”143 Ida Zehmer
similarly testified that her husband rejected the money because he did
not want to be bound to the deal: she recounted him saying, “No, this
is liquor talking. I don’t want to sell the farm, I have told you that I
want my son to have it. This is all a joke.”144
Thus, both Lucy and Zehmer apparently believed that token payments could create a contract. In many jurisdictions, and in almost all
classrooms, that view is derided as hopelessly naı̈ve and unsophisticated. But our experimental results provide some evidence as to why lay
promisors and promisees continue to exchange small bits of money
Id. at 517.
Id. at 517–18.
139 Id. at 518.
140 Id. Zehmer, by contrast, testified that he responded to the offer by saying: “Hell no, that
is beer and liquor talking. I am not going to sell you the farm. I have told you that too many
times before.” Id. at 519.
141 Keith A. Rowley, You Asked for It, You Got It . . . Toy Yoda: Practical Jokes, Prizes,
and Contract Law, 3 NEV. L.J. 526, 527 n.7 (2003) (Lucy as a contracts casebook staple).
142 See Barak Richman & Dennis Schmelzer, When Money Grew on Trees: Lucy v. Zehmer
and Contracting in a Boom Market, 61 DUKE L.J. 1511, 1520–21 (2012) (suggesting that because
Lucy hired one of the state’s most renowned attorneys prior to engaging with Zehmer, he was
expecting a legal fight to ensue).
143 Lucy, 84 S.E.2d at 520.
144 Id.
137
138
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when promising. As Fuller argued, nominal consideration actually
handed over is “really effective in achieving the formal desiderata”145
as it, in effect, gives extra weight to the promise.
Now, an attentive reader may object and suggest that our payments were not in fact nominal (i.e., $1.00 or $0.25 is actually a fair
percentage of the average amount we paid subjects). When we reduced that bonus to $0.05, we observed no effects on the likelihood to
back out, suggesting the bonus effects in our study result from norms
of reciprocity, rather than from the formality itself. Thus, Melvin Eisenberg and others may have gone too far in thinking that nominal
consideration has a purely symbolic role.146 Further experiments could
work harder to tease out this effect: Under what circumstances do token payments attending the bargain trigger reciprocity norms and
when are they ignored? Is the ratio between the size of the underlying
performance and the size of the token crucial, or merely the absolute
size of the latter? Does counterparty identity matter (that is, are individuals more likely to think that token payments from other individuals, as opposed to firms, are meaningful)? Answering these kinds of
questions would help us to develop the contours of a proposed revision to Restatement (Second) section 79.
3. Are Disclaimers in Contracts the Same as Disclaimers of
Contract?
In some ways, our most unexpected and intriguing finding concerns disclaimers. Contrary to the limited experimental evidence
available to date,147 we find that disclaimers of contractual obligation
perversely increase the likelihood of promise keeping. We think that
this finding, if born out in further research, poses a serious challenge
to and engages with three important strands in modern contract theory and doctrine.
The first challenge is posed to the theory that contractual obligation rests on the parties’ explicitly stated intent to be bound. This theory, best articulated by Randy Barnett but advanced by others,148
posits that statements of intent to be bound and intent not to be
Fuller, supra note 1, at 823.
Eisenberg, supra note 53, at 660–61 (“[I]t can be safely assumed that parties who falsely
cast a nonbargain promise as a bargain do so for the express purpose of making the promise
legally enforceable.”).
147 See supra text accompanying notes 79–85.
148 See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract
Law and the “Invisible Handshake”, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 903, 917 (1985) (suggesting that enforcement of disclaimers is necessary to preserve contract law’s autonomy interests).
145
146
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bound ought to be treated equivalently by law.149 The reason is simple:
it seems intuitive to such authors that clauses that signal an intent to
be bound and clauses that disclaim such intent would have the same
behavioral valence. But our perverse disclaimers unsettle that assumption. At the very least, we have shown that the question of whether to
treat intent to be bound and intent to be unbound similarly should be
answered empirically.
Second, we think we have found preliminary evidence that
courts’ current treatment of disclaimer clauses should be reexamined.
As we explored above, such clauses are increasingly common in the
employment context. In the comfort of chambers, courts reading such
clauses routinely ask: how could anyone reading this clause think that
they were entering into a contract? At most, courts call for clearer and
more conspicuous disclaimers of obligation, as if the problem was one
of information availability rather than processing. But we think that
this approach may be self-defeating. If, indeed, disclaimers have a perverse behavioral effect and encourage parties to think that relational
norms govern rather than brutish law, readers of disclaimers may be
in the worst of all possible worlds. Ex ante, they feel that they are
protected by social norms and consequently do not protect themselves; ex post, courts judge them for failing to read and exercise
caution.
Third, our experiments may expand on recent work on “no contract” clauses by Oren Bar-Gill and Omri Ben-Shahar.150 “No contract” clauses are now common in advertising from cellphone
companies and for other consumer goods: they explicitly disclaim contracts (while, in fact, binding users to terms but freeing them from
termination fees).151 Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar defend “no contract”
contracts as “effectively and nondeceptively [signaling] that consumers are not going to be stuck prospectively with a contract they do not
like.”152 As such, they are a bonding mechanism (and a signal of high
quality), accompanied by more subtle costs to exit.
To Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar’s subtle and powerful analysis, we
would add the following caveat: “no contract” clauses may not be attractive simply because they promise a world free from termination
fees. They may be attractive because customers wrongly believe that
“no contract” actually means “no contract,” which is appealing in a
149
150
151
152

See Barnett, supra note 68, at 535.
See Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar, supra note 105.
Id. at 152.
Id. at 159.
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world in which the idea of “being in a contract” has taken on a negative connotation.153 Our experimental results provide suggestive and
preliminary evidence of that possibility: when told they were not in a
contract, individuals behaved in a less self-protective way. Here too,
more work is necessary to flesh out the limits of the observed phenomenon and theorized extension.154
B. Individual Differences
Though gender and age effects in contractual compliance have
been noted in the past,155 we are unaware of results as stark as the
ones we have described here. Our results present a puzzle. Why do
older individuals behave so differently than younger ones, and males
so differently than females, when faced with decisions to breach online contracts?
First, older individuals are more likely to possess different baserate expectations in their evaluations of when they are taking some
action to establish a valid, binding legal contractual commitment to do
something or not do something, as compared to younger individuals.
Specifically, for older participants, clicking to agree to something is a
more meaningful analog to signing one’s name on a contract. For
these people, signing one’s name signifies a binding commitment to a
course of action, whether one understands everything in the document
or not. For younger individuals, their base-rate expectation for contract norms may come not from arms-length exchange analogs, but
from digital exchange, in which clicking to agree is a meaningless action, devoid of genuine commitment.156
That is, for younger individuals, clicking “I agree” is a necessary
act performed ritualistically in order to receive the underlying benefit
of the bargain.157 That experience forms the basis for the deeply inId. at 180–81; see also Eigen, Devil in the Details, supra note 119.
For more on this possibility, see generally David A. Hoffman, From Promise to Form:
How Contracting Online Changes Consumers, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1595 (2016).
155 See Eigen, Terms and Conditions, supra note 74, at 28 (“[A] one-bracket increase in
reported age (the brackets are ordinal, in 3-year intervals), is associated with a 12% increase in
the odds of taking the survey only one time (p < .001) [which, in Eigen’s work, could be coded as
breach].”).
156 The observation that online norms are contingent on age is not novel. See JOHN PALFREY & URS GASSER, BORN DIGITAL: UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST GENERATION OF DIGITAL
NATIVES 1 (2008). Palfrey, like we do, identifies the demarcation point as 1980. Id. But see
DANAH BOYD, IT’S COMPLICATED: THE SOCIAL LIVES OF NETWORKED TEENS 176–98 (2014)
(warning against simplification of generational differences).
157 Nancy Kim’s work also suggests this though she is not focused on cohort effects. See
Kim, supra note 25, at 1348.
153
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grained understanding of contracts. If one wants to use Facebook, one
has to agree to Facebook’s terms and conditions. If one wants to
download software one has purchased, one has to first click a button
that may (or may not) signify assent to a contract. Younger individuals
are more likely to have been weaned on clicking (to acquiesce) as a
form of ritualistic behavior one must do in order to see the next screen
on a webpage or download the clip one wants to view.158 Older individuals experience these types of contracts all the time as well, but
perhaps they have a different experiential basis for their deeply-ingrained understanding of contract, which involves to a greater degree
the moral norms of promise keeping derived from arms-length
exchange.
With this difference in base-rate expectations, one would expect
the recital condition to impact age cohorts quite differently. Perhaps
the recital condition signals to an older cohort that they are entering
into a legally binding commitment to do something, derived from their
base-rate expectation of an arms-length exchange. For a younger cohort, this might not be the case. Their base-rate expectation is that
clicking to agree is a meaningless act. Language of contract is a stream
of text that washes over, unrecognized as anything more than a hoop
through which to jump in order to get on with the exchange. They
click to agree in order to receive the benefit of the underlying bargain
independent of the words and what they stand for. Indeed, in the recital
condition, 39.9% of participants 35 years or older backed out of their
commitments. But a majority (52.1%) of subjects 18–34 backed out.
This difference is statistically significant (p = .02).
To put it differently, we hypothesize that individuals born after
1980 experience contracts online in a fundamentally different way
than those born in earlier decades. For such individuals, being in a
digital “contract” does not hearken back to a bilateral, legal relationship commitment based on a signature, but rather an imposition and a
click. So understood, the consideration recitals we have explored are
not simply a curiosity important to law professors and 1L contracts
students, they are the canary in the coal mine, singing of a generational difference in contracting behavior that has not yet found
purchase in contract law. Our experimental findings are consistent
with this theory. We must caution readers, however, that we are not
suggesting that these results on their own support this theory. Rather,
we posit that other empirical and theoretical work in this field cumula158

See PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 156, at 36.
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tively supports this hypothesis, and these results are merely suggestive
and consistent.159 We are cautious not to overstep the bounds of
proper inference derived from the main effects and their straightforward interpretation discussed above.
Second, women are much more likely than men to remain committed to their original agreements. To repeat a statistic from earlier
in this Article, across all conditions, 51% of men backed out of their
agreements, while only 31% of women did. The difference is extremely robust, statistically significant, and large in magnitude. It is
not, however, entirely surprising in light of previous experiments finding that in conditions of ambiguity, women behave less self-interestedly than men.160 Arguably, the conditions of our experiment were
ambiguous—we suggested to parties that they were in a contract, but
provided no sanction for breach and, in a way, invited it. But that
same argument could be made for other contracts studies, none of
which found such robust gender effects on contractual obligation.161
This experiment thus brings the contracts experimental literature
closer to a much larger tradition on gender effects in negotiation,162
and suggests that this area is ripe for further study.
C. Limitations
This Article presents preliminary evidence that endowment of a
small amount of money, together with a recital of consideration and a
recital disclaiming obligation, are both qualitatively different from
“natural” consideration and different from a naked recital in terms of
159 One of us has taken up the challenge of further work on age and contract behavior. See
Hoffman, Promise to Form, supra note 154, at 16 (finding robust age effects across different
contracting contexts).
160 See, e.g., Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, Boys Will Be Boys: Gender, Overconfidence, and Common Stock Investment, 116 Q.J. ECON. 261, 264–66 (2001) (men are more risk
seeking than women); Hannah Riley Bowles et al., Constraints and Triggers: Situational Mechanics of Gender in Negotiation, 89 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 951, 957 (2005) (“Under high
ambiguity . . . male buyers walked out of the negotiation paying 27% less than did female buyers.”); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Deborah Small, Negotiating Divorce: Gender and the Behavioral
Economics of Divorce Bargaining, 26 LAW & INEQ. 109, 116–20, 125–26 (2008) (discussing research regarding gender in negotiations); Wilkinson-Ryan, Transferring Trust, supra note 91, at
526–27 n.35 (no differences in main effect but women returned more than men to
counterparties).
161 Eigen, Terms and Conditions, supra note 74, at 31 (no effect); Hoffman & WilkinsonRyan, Psychology of Contract, supra note 20, at 441 (no effect); Wilkinson-Ryan, Fine Print,
supra note 89, at 1773 n.113 (no differences); Wilkinson-Ryan, Liquidated Damages, supra note
75, at 664 (no effect, but noting trend that women were less likely to breach).
162 See, e.g., LINDA BABCOCK & SARA LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON’T ASK: NEGOTIATION
AND THE GENDER DIVIDE (2003).
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the likelihood of contracting parties feeling bound to their bargains.
Given the experimental setting, caution must be taken in interpreting
these results. But we think they provide both some preliminary answers to old questions and an important prod for further research in
the field.
The setting for this experiment was an online agreement in which
a stylized rendition of bargainedfor exchange is taking place. Subjects
were aware that they were in an experimental setting, and that they
were expressing preferences for charitable giving or dividing money
between two individuals naming a book. They were informed that the
money being allocated was real, but they were presented by the experimenters (the parties with whom they were contracting) with an option to back out of their commitment, which may legitimate that
decision. At best, our behavioral measure should be characterized as a
stylized version of breach.163
This is both a limitation on the generalizability of the study and a
design advantage. We are intentionally observing behaviors in this setting as a preliminary attempt to test the behavioral waters in which
there are lowered expectations of differences of commitment to a contract as compared to “real world” instances of contract (either online
or otherwise) in which more is at stake, and there may be both actual
and perceived sanctions (legal and non-legal) associated with breach.
If anything, the effects observed in this setting may be taken as evidence of a lower bound of the differences in behavior that result from
differences in contract framing that exist in non-experimental settings.
CONCLUSION
Contract law’s stance on private party control over enforcement
is widely seen as incoherent. While the Restatement (Second) rejects
recitals of consideration generally, it accepts them in the option context, even while it disdains nominal consideration, whether or not delivered.164 Modern courts are generally more accepting of highly
formal means of indicating enforceability than the Restatement’s summary might suggest, but no dominant pattern of enforcement holds.165
Seemingly all that contract judges and scholars can agree on is that
Fuller was right: contract formalities caution readers.
163 Doctrinally speaking, the invitation to back out of the bargain would not be regarded as
a license to breach.
164 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
165 See supra Section I.A.
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We have described the first experimental test of this consensus.
We find that while small sums of money attending the bargain motivate promise keeping, recitals standing alone do not. At the same
time, recitals disclaiming obligation seem to cause people to be less
likely to breach. A fundamental pillar of modern contract doctrine
appears either to be cracked or in need of serious refurbishment. Perhaps our chosen formalities are so obscure that they no longer retain
symbolic meaning. If so, modernizing them, and accounting for demographic differences in behavior, poses important and urgent challenges for the next generation of contract scholarship.

